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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Richard Pena appeals asserting that the district court erred by admitting, over his 
objection, propensity evidence of his prior encounters with police because that evidence 
was not relevant to any non-propensity purpose that was actually at issue in this case.  
Furthermore, the prejudicial impact of that evidence substantially outweighed its minimal 
probative value.  Therefore, this Court should vacate the judgment of conviction in this 
case and remand for further proceedings. 
 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 When an acquaintance asked Mr. Pena to give her and her friend a ride home 
from a bar one night because he had not been drinking, Mr. Pena did so.  (Tr., p.386, 
Ls.1-11.)1  The acquaintance’s friend lived in an area with which Mr. Pena was not 
familiar.  (Tr., p.511, Ls.17-19.)  As a result, he only signaled for a short period before 
turning into the trailer park where the friend lived.  (See Tr., p.511, Ls.19-21.)  
Unfortunately for Mr. Pena, an officer following him initiated a traffic stop based on an 
improper signal.  (See Tr., p.183, L.11 - p.184, L.15.)   
 Mr. Pena provided the officer with his license and registration.  (Tr., p.186, 
Ls.9-12.)  When the officer ran that information through dispatch, he confirmed 
Mr. Pena was the lawful owner of the car.  (Tr., p.188, L.24 - p.189, L.1; see Exhibits, 
                                            
1 The transcripts of this case were provided in three independently bound and paginated 
volumes.  The first two are designated as “Vol.1” and “Vol.2.”  The third, containing the 
transcripts of the trial testimony, does not have an independent volume identification 
number.  Unless otherwise indicated by the applicable volume number, citations to “Tr.” 
are to the volume containing the transcripts of the trial testimony. 
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p.2 (the registration for the vehicle).)2  However, the officer also learned Mr. Pena’s 
license was suspended and there was a warrant for his arrest.  (Tr., p.190, Ls.10-13; 
Tr., p.190, L.24 - p.191, L.1.)  As a result, he placed Mr. Pena under arrest and took him 
from the scene.  (See Tr., p.199, Ls.6-15.)     
Based on the officers’ observations of Mr. Pena behavior during the traffic stop, 
Mr. Pena was evaluated at the jail to determine whether he had been driving under the 
influence.  (See, e.g., Tr., p.197, L.12 - p.198, L.7.)  The officer who conducted that 
evaluation believed Mr. Pena was under the influence of a stimulant, but did not testify 
as to what type of stimulant he suspected Mr. Pena of ingesting.  (See Tr., p.267, 
Ls.9-13.)  A subsequent analysis of Mr. Pena’s blood revealed methamphetamine.  
(Tr., p.301, L.20 - p.302, L.10.)  However, Mr. Pena testified that he had used several 
days before and was not feeling the effects of that use.  (Tr., p.524, Ls.4-8.) 
Meanwhile, two other officers conducted an inventory search of Mr. Pena’s car in 
preparation for towing it.  (See, e.g., Tr., p.310, L.24 - p.311, L.10.)  During that search, 
they found a gun under the driver’s seat.  (Tr., p.312, L.6 - p.313, L.12.)  One of the 
officers also found a soap dish in front of the center console.  (Tr., p.316, Ls.18-25.)  
When he opened that container, he found additional ammunition.  (Tr., p.318, Ls.8-9; 
Tr., p.316, L.24 - p.317, L.3.)  Finally, they found various vials and syringes in the center 
console and the back of the car.  (Tr., p.318, L.20 - p.319, L.5; Tr., p.322, Ls.12-16.)  
Mr. Pena ultimately admitted that those vials and syringes were his for use of 
testosterone and methamphetamine.  (Tr., p.533, Ls.12-19.)   
                                            
2 Copies of the documents and pictures admitted as exhibits at trial are provided in a 
separate PDF document from the rest of the Clerk’s Record.  References to that 
document will be designated “Exhibits” and will use the PDF page number. 
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 Forensic examination of the gun and the soap dish revealed three fingerprints 
that could be evaluated for identification purposes.  (Tr., p.454, Ls.3-7.)  Two were 
found on the soap dish.  (Tr., p.454, Ls.13-16.)  The third was found on an interior layer 
of tape covering the handle of the gun.  (Tr., p.454, Ls.22-23.)  Subsequent evaluation 
of those prints revealed that none of them came from Mr. Pena.  (Tr., p.460, L.18 - 
p.461, L.9; Tr., p.474, Ls.23-24.)   
Mr. Pena testified that, while the car was his and he used it often, he also 
regularly leant it to friends to use.  (Tr., p.527, Ls.14-19; Tr., p.528, Ls.14-15.)  He also 
testified that he did not know the gun was in his car.  (Tr., p.534, Ls.8-13) 
 Nevertheless, Mr. Pena was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm, 
misdemeanor driving under the influence (hereinafter, DUI), driving without privileges, 
possession of drug paraphernalia, and misdemeanor possession of the testosterone, a 
schedule III narcotic.  (R., pp.29-31.)  The State subsequently filed an Information part 
II, alleging Mr. Pena to be a persistent violator.  (R., pp.64-66.)   
 Prior to trial, the prosecutor filed a notice of intent to present evidence about 
Mr. Pena’s prior convictions in relation to the unlawful possession of a firearm charge.  
(R., pp.51-52.)  The district court ultimately ruled that, if Mr. Pena made a sufficient 
stipulation that he had been convicted of a felony which would bring him under the 
unlawful possession statute, evidence of the nature of that felony would be 
inadmissible.  (Tr., p.12, Ls.6-9.)  Mr. Pena made a sufficient stipulation.  (Tr., p.19, 
Ls.22-25.)  As a result, the jurors were simply instructed that Mr. Pena had stipulated he 
had been convicted of a qualifying felony, and they were not to speculate as to the 
nature of that felony.  (Tr., p.379, Ls.6-17; R., p.171.)   
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However, there was a related aspect of that issue which remained unresolved 
heading into the trial – whether the State could present an audio recording from the stop 
wherein Mr. Pena had expressed his desire to not have the officers search his car 
because they had done so on several prior occasions.  (See, e.g., Tr., p.164, Ls.6-8.)  
The district court ultimately determined the audio would be inadmissible because 
Mr. Pena had invoked his Fourth Amendment rights during that conversation, and the 
only remaining question was whether there would be a limitation on that ruling, whether 
the audio “can be used if it is relevant to another purpose.”  (Tr., p.376, Ls.12-18.)  The 
district court determined that, “unless the defendant does something to open the door 
by denying ownership or control of the car itself,” there audio recording would remain 
inadmissible.  (Tr., p.377, Ls.15-18.)   
But, in discussing that issue, another related issue came up:  the prosecutor 
anticipated that some of the officers would testify that they had seen Mr. Pena driving 
this same car on several prior occasions, though she did not anticipate them getting into 
any more detail than that.  (Tr., p.171, Ls.2-25.)  Defense counsel objected, asserting 
that was improper propensity evidence.  (Tr., p.164, Ls.18-20, p.171, Ls.17-18.)  
Defense counsel explained that “we’re not disagreeing this is his car and that he drives 
it, so I don’t see how that [proposed testimony] is a rebuttal to -- an assertion that he 
also loans it out.”  (Tr., p.171, Ls.14-17.)  The district court decided the officers could 
testify as to those previous encounters with Mr. Pena in the limited fashion described by 
the prosecutor because the district court concluded, “it’s evidence of not only his 
ownership, which may not be in dispute, but his use of the vehicle, and therefore, his 
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potential control of anything in the vehicle.  Sounds like if it’s a month or so before, it’s 
close enough in time to make it relevant.”  (Tr., p.172, Ls.12-17.)  
As a result, during the prosecutor’s case-in-chief, Officer Miller testified that he 
had seen Mr. Pena driving that vehicle approximately three times in the six to eight 
months preceding the stop in this case.  (Tr., p.347, Ls.4-10.)  Similarly, Officer Muguira 
testified that he had seen Mr. Pena driving that vehicle three times in the two and one-
half to three months preceding the stop in this case.  (Tr., p.307, Ls.8-16.)     
 The jury ultimately convicted Mr. Pena of unlawful possession of a firearm, 
driving without privileges,3 possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of a 
controlled substance.  (R., pp.190-91.)  However, it acquitted Mr. Pena on the 
misdemeanor DUI charge.  (R., p.190.)  After that verdict was entered, Mr. Pena 
admitted the allegations in the Information part II.  (Tr., Vol.1, p.52, L.11 - p.56, L.4.)   
The district court subsequently sentenced Mr. Pena to a unified term of twenty 
years, with seven years fixed (five years fixed, zero indeterminate for unlawful 
possession of a firearm and a consecutive term of two years fixed, thirteen years 
indeterminate, on the persistent violator enhancement), with concurrent sentences for 
the misdemeanor convictions.  (Tr., Vol.1, p.72, Ls.3-16; R., pp.195-96.)  Mr. Pena filed 
a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction.  (R., pp.202-04.) 
  
 
      
                                            
3 Mr. Pena had admitted during his testimony that he knew his license was suspended.  




Whether the district court erred by determining the evidence of Mr. Pena’s prior 




The District Court Erred By Determining The Evidence Of Mr. Pena’s Prior Encounters 
With Police Was Admissible Propensity Evidence 
 
 
A. Standard Of Review 
 
When reviewing the admission of evidence of prior conduct under this rule, the 
courts apply a two-part test:  “(1) whether, under I.R.E. 404(b), the evidence is relevant 
as a matter of law to an issue other than the defendant’s character or criminal 
propensity; and (2) whether, under I.R.E. 403, the district court abused its discretion in 
finding the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant.”  State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 8 (2013) 
(internal quotation omitted).  The questions of law are reviewed de novo.  Id. at 6.  The 
questions of discretion are reviewed under the three-step inquiry from State v. Hedger, 
115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989).  Joy, 155 Idaho at 6. 
 
B. The Testimony About The Officers’ Prior Encounters With Mr. Pena Was Not 
Relevant To A Non-Propensity Purpose That Was Actually At Issue In This Case 
 
For evidence of prior conduct to be relevant to a non-propensity purpose, the 
past and presently-charged events “must be linked by common characteristics that go 
beyond merely showing a criminal propensity and instead, must objectively tend to 
establish that the same person committed all the acts.”  State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 
664, 668 (2010).  Put another way, “[e]vidence of uncharged misconduct must be 
relevant to a material and disputed issue concerning the crime charged, other than 
propensity.”  State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52 (2009).  In this case, the officers’ testimony 
about having previously encountered Mr. Pena while he was driving this same vehicle 
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was not relevant to a material and disputed issue, and therefore, only constituted 
propensity evidence.  Compare State v. Naranjo, 152 Idaho 134, 138 (Ct. App. 2011) 
(finding that testimony from a confidential informant about previous instances when he 
bought drugs from the defendant was not relevant to a material and disputed issue 
about the sale for which the defendant was charged, thus holding it was improper 
propensity evidence); cf. United States v. Scott, 677 F.3d 72, 78-79 (2nd Cir. 2012) 
(applying a similar rule to a factual scenario similar to this case and finding that 
evidence was improper propensity evidence).    
The district court decided the propensity evidence in this case was relevant to 
show that Mr. Pena owned and used the vehicle, and thus, was more likely to have 
known about, and so, possessed, the items therein.  (Tr., p.172, Ls.12-17.)  However, 
as defense counsel pointed out, the defense was not disputing the fact that Mr. Pena 
owned and used that vehicle.  (Tr., p.171, Ls.14-16.)  In fact, the district court 
recognized that Mr. Pena had not put his ownership or use of the car at issue in this 
case, as it held the audio recording, which also referenced these previous encounters 
was inadmissible “unless the defendant does something to open the door by denying 
ownership or control of the car itself.”  (Tr., p.377, Ls.15-18; cf. Tr., p.172, Ls.14-15 
(recognizing “his ownership [of the car], which may not be in dispute . . . . .”).)  Since 
that was not a disputed issue, that was not a valid non-propensity reason to allow the 
prior acts testimony in.  Grist, 147 Idaho at 52; cf. State v. Dragoman, 130 Idaho 537, 
545 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding that officers’ testimony about prior, unrelated encounters 
with the defendant were not relevant to a non-propensity purpose), superseded by 
statute on other grounds. 
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As both the Idaho Supreme Court and Court of Appeals have made clear, there 
must be limits on the use of prior bad acts evidence; the exceptions are not to be given 
expansive effect.  Grist, 147 Idaho at 54 (quoting State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559 (2007), 
and State v. Tolman, 121 Idaho 899 (1992), overruled in part by Grist).  Broadly 
allowing propensity evidence, as the district court did in this case, would “virtually 
eviscerate[]” the restrictions 404(b) establishes.  State v. Cook, 144 Idaho 784, 788-89 
(Ct. App. 2007).  Since the propensity evidence offered in this case – the officers’ 
testimony to seeing Mr. Pena driving this car in the months preceding the alleged 
incident – was not relevant to a material and disputed non-propensity basis, it was 
inadmissible under I.R.E. 404(b).  Therefore, the district court’s order to the contrary is 
erroneous and should be reversed. 
 
C. The Prejudice Presented By The Propensity Evidence Substantially Outweighed 
Its Minimal Probative Value 
 
Even if this Court determines the testimony about the officers seeing Mr. Pena 
driving this car in the months preceding the alleged incident is relevant to a non-
propensity purpose, the prejudice presented by that testimony substantially outweighed 
its minimal probative value, and so, it should still have been excluded.  See Joy, 155 
Idaho at 6.     
For example, that evidence was minimally probative because there was sufficient 
other, non-propensity evidence in the record which spoke to the point to which the 
district court decided this testimony was relevant.  The registration papers Mr. Pena 
provided identified him as the owner of the car.  (Tr., p.186, Ls.9-12; Tr., p.188, 
L.24 - p.189, L.1; see Exhibits, p.2.)  The officer who pulled Mr. Pena over testified he 
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had confirmed that fact.  (Tr., p.188, L.24 - p.189, L.1.)  Mr. Pena was driving the car 
when it was pulled over, which demonstrates he uses the car.  (Tr., p.187, L.23 - p.188, 
L.5.)  Finally, Mr. Pena testified that it was his car and he used it regularly.  (Tr., p.527, 
Ls.14-19; Tr., p.528, Ls.14-15.)  Therefore, the officers’ testimony about seeing 
Mr. Pena drive this car, so as to establish Mr. Pena’s ownership and use of the car, was 
wholly cumulative.  When evidence is merely cumulative, it is less likely to be 
admissible because its probative value is compromised.  See I.R.E. 403.  Since this 
evidence is cumulative, it has, at best, minimal probative value. 
On the other hand, the risk of undue prejudice is high.  Conveniently, the Second 
Circuit has engaged in an in-depth evaluation of this question in regard to similar 
testimony.  See Scott, 677 F.3d at 84; cf. Dragoman, 130 Idaho at 545 (reaching a 
similar conclusion to Scott on similar facts without going into as much explanation).  “It 
stretches credulity to think that a jury would assume that the defendant’s lengthy and 
numerous contacts with the police were not, in some sense, related to his bad character 
and criminal propensity, even if evidence of these contacts did not lead the same jury to 
conclude that he had been previously arrested.  This is the essence of prejudice.”  
Scott, 677 F.3d at 84.  “Jurors would have drawn from it the conclusion that [the 
defendant] had previously had significant contact with the police.  Moreover, they were 
told that this contact helped the detectives identify what he was doing, thus implying 
they knew what he was likely to be doing.”  Id.   
The Scott Court distinguished “other cases in which identity was actually in 
dispute, [where] that prejudice might be outweighed by the evidence’s probative value, 
and the evidence may be admissible.”  Id.  “But here, given that the only proper purpose 
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for the testimony was an issue not in dispute, we have no trouble concluding that the 
potential prejudice of this testimony outweighed any conceivable probative value.”  Id.; 
cf. Grist, 147 Idaho at 52 (also holding that propensity evidence needs to be relevant to 
an issue in dispute). 
Those same issues are evident in this case because of the efforts the district 
court and the parties had taken to limit the discussion of Mr. Pena’s criminal history in 
this case.  The jurors were only informed that he had stipulated to the fact that he had 
been convicted of a qualifying felony, and they were instructed they were not to 
speculate as to the nature of it.  (Tr., p.379, Ls.6-17; R., p.171.)  The district court also 
held that, while testimony could be given that officers found pictures of Mr. Pena in the 
car, they could not testify as to the nature of those pictures – pictures from prison 
(see R., p.51) – because of the prejudicial impact and limited probative value of that 
information.  (See Tr., Vol.2, p.36, Ls.8-17.)  Based, in part, on similar reasons, the 
district court excluded the audio recording which referenced Mr. Pena’s previous 
encounters with law enforcement.  (Tr., p.376, L.16 - p.377, L.18.)  All these rulings 
were designed to keep the information about Mr. Pena’s previous encounters with law 
enforcement to a minimum in the trial because such information would have been 
unduly prejudicial.  
The district court’s decision to allow the officers to testify that they kept having 
encounters with Mr. Pena leading up to the event at issue runs contrary to those efforts.  
That evidence leads to the situation the Scott Court highlighted – it allows the jury to 
draw the inference that the officers thought Mr. Pena was continuing to get into trouble, 
and so, he must have been in trouble this time, or they were keeping an eye on him 
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because they knew he was likely to be getting into trouble.  Compare Scott, 677 F.3d at 
84.  Such inferences are at the heart of why such evidence is inadmissible.   
Therefore, the district court erred in admitting that evidence in light of its overly-
prejudicial and minimally-probative nature.  That means, even if it were relevant to a 
non-propensity purpose, this testimony should still have been excluded, and the district 
court’s failure to do so constituted an abuse of its discretion. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 Mr. Pena respectfully requests this Court vacate the judgment of conviction in 
this case and remand the case for further proceedings. 
 DATED this 23rd day of February, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      BRIAN R. DICKSON 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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